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THE MARYLAND CERTIFICATE OF QUALIFIED EXPERT 
REQUIREMENT: A FLIMSY SHIELD FOR CORPORATIONS 
ENGAGED IN ARCHITECTURE AND 
PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERING 
I. INTRODUCTION 
If an individual sues a licensed professional in Maryland, it is clear 
that he or she must file a certificate of a qualified expert within ninety 
days after filing the complaint. l Failure to do so entitles the defen-
dant to dismissal without prejudice.2 This provision applies to "li-
censed professionals,"3 which include architects, interior designers, 
landscape architects, professional engineers, and professional land 
surveyors or property line surveyors.4 On the other hand, the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland has held that a corporate defendant, which 
offers the above-listed professional services, is not entitled to dismissal 
without prejudice if the plaintiff fails to file a certificate of a qualified 
expert. 5 This issue is particularly important to practitioners in con-
struction law, as the Court of Appeals' decision allows a suit against a 
corporate defendant to be maintained if a certificate of a qualified 
expert is not filed. Further, if a corporate defendant is not entitled to 
the protection offered by the certificate of a qualified expert require-
ment, complainants may be able to engage in legalized blackmail 
against corporate defendants who have not actually provided services 
negligently.6 Although the Court of Appeals of Maryland has ruled 
on the issue,7 its decision was erroneous and did not consider the se-
vere impact on corporate defendants. 
1. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2C-02(a)(I)-(2) (2002). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. § 3-2G-Ol(b); see also id. at § 3-2G-02(a). 
4. Id. § 3-2C-Ol(c) (1)-(5). 
5. Baltimore County v. RTKL Assocs. Inc., 380 Md. 670, 690, 846 A.2d 433, 
445 (2004). This decision can be contrasted with the 2002 decision by the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, which indicated that if a complain-
ant sues a corporation engaged in professional engineering, failure to file a 
certificate of a qualified expert does entitle the defendant to dismissal with-
out prejudice. Heritage Harbour, L.L.C. v. John J. Reynolds, Inc., 143 Md. 
App. 698, 709, 795 A.2d 806, 812 (2002). The U.S. District Court for the 
District of Maryland, however, has explicitly held that a professional associa-
tion engaged in engineering is not entitled to dismissal based on the com-
plaining party's failure to file a certificate of a qualified expert. Adams v. 
NVR Homes, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 675,716 (D. Md. 2001). Each of these 
cases will be discussed in greater detail infra Parts III.B.I-B.3. 
6. This possibility is outlined in detail infra Part 1I1.E. 
7. See, e.g. RTKL Assocs., Inc., 380 Md. at 689-90,846 A.2d at 444-45. 
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This comment will explore whether a corporation practicing archi-
tecture should be entitled to the protections offered by the certificate 
of a qualified expert requirement. Furthermore, this comment will 
argue that such protections should also extend to a corporation prac-
ticing professional engineering even though professional engineering 
firms are not required to file with the State Board for Professional 
Engineers.8 
In Parts II.A.-II.B., this comment outlines the general requirements 
for architectural and engineering practice in Maryland. In Part II.C., 
it provides an in-depth analysis of the certificate of qualified expert 
requirement. In Part II.D., it explores how other states with similar 
laws have ruled on the issue. Then Part III.A. illustrates how Maryland 
courts have interpreted a similar provision in the Health Care Mal-
practice Statute.9 Part III.B. discusses the cases, in detail, which have 
interpreted the statute. Part III.C. focuses on the purposes of corpo-
rate practice and the rationale behind the statute requiring a certifi-
cate of a qualified expert. Part III.D. addresses arguments against the 
extension of the protection to corporate practice. Part III.E. demon-
strates that the protection offered by the certificate of a qualified ex-
pert requirement must be extended to corporations practicing 
architecture and professional engineering. Finally, Part III.F. illus-
trates that no distinction should be made between corporations that 
practice architecture and those engaged in professional engineering. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Practice of Architecture 
An individual may practice architecture,1O provided he or she ob-
tains a license from the State Board of Architects to do SO.11 Maryland 
requires that an architect obtain a license to practice architecture be-
cause of the state's interest in "safeguard[ingJ life, health, public 
8. See MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Oee. & PROF. §§ 14-10l to 14-602 (2004). There 
are no provisions in the Maryland Professional Engineers Act that require a 
corporation practicing professional engineering to file anything with the 
State Board for Professional Engineers. See id. Conversely, in the Maryland 
Architects Act, corporations practicing architecture are required to obtain 
a permit from the State Board of Architects. Id. § 3-403(a). 
9. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PRoe. § 3-2A-04(b) (Supp.2004). 
10. "Practice architecture" is defined as "provid[ingJ any service or creative 
work: (i) in regard to an addition to, alteration of, or construction of a 
building or an integral part of a building; and (ii) that requires education, 
training, and experience in architecture." MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Oee. & 
PROF. § 3-101 (l) (1) (2004). Activities that fall within the meaning of prac-
tice architecture include architectural design, consultation, coordination of 
the design, evaluation of the design, investigation of a design, and plan-
ning. Id. § 3-lO1 (l)(2). 
11. Id. § 3-302(a). 
2004] The Maryland Certificate of Qualified Expert 243 
safety, and property and [in] promot[ing] the public welfare."12 To 
obtain a license, the applicant must meet certain preliminary require-
ments13 and pass an examination given by the State Board of 
Architects.14 
A single architect or group of architects can form a variety of corpo-
rate entities. An architect can choose to form a corporation by filing 
articles of incorporation with the State Department of Assessments 
and Taxation (SDAT); the corporate existence begins when the SDAT 
accepts the articles.15 An architect, or group of architects, also has the 
option of forming a close corporation by stating the election in the 








Id. § 3-102. Maryland courts have determined that requiring a license for 
the practice of architecture is not a revenue measure, but rather regulatory 
in nature. Snodgrass v. Immler, 232 Md. 416, 422, 194 A.2d 103, 106 
(1963). Therefore, a suit by an unlicensed architect for architectural fees 
will not prevail. Id. at 424, 194 A.2d at 107. 
MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ. & PROF. § 3-303(a)-(c). The applicant must "be 
of good character and reputation." Id. § 3-303(b). The applicant must also 
meet minimum education and experience levels. Id. § 3-303(c). 
Id. § 3-303(d). 
MD. CODE ANN., CORPs. & AsS'NS § 2-102(a)-(b) (1999); Bostetter v. Frees-
tate Land Corp., 48 Md. App. 142, 148,426 A.2d 404, 408 (1981), modified, 
292 Md. 570, 440 A.2d 380 (1982). 
MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'NS § 4-201 (a)-(b) (1). Many architects, when 
forming corporations, choose to form a close corporation. By forming a 
close corporation, the shareholders (who will most likely be running the 
business) may be excused from having to comply with a number of corpo-
rate formalities. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON & JONATHAN R. MAcEY, CAsES 
AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LI-
ABILI1Y COMPANIES 513 (8th ed. 2003). For instance, a corporation that 
elects to be a close corporation can also elect to operate without a board of 
directors. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & AsS'NS § 4-302. For a complete analy-
sis of close corporation law, see Ronald M. Shapiro, The Statutory Close Corpo-
ration: A Critique and a Corporate Planning Alternative, 36 MD. L. REv. 289 
(1976). 
MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & AsS'NS § 5-102(a). A professional corporation is 
one that offers professional services. Id. Architecture is a professional ser-
vice. Id. § 5-101 (g)(2)(i). A professional corporation may only issue stock 
to individuals who are licensed in any state to practice the same profession 
as that listed in the articles of incorporation, a general partnership consist-
ing solely of licensees with at least one partner licensed in the state of Mary-
land, or another professional corporation organized to perform the same 
service. Id. § 5-109(a). A majority of the professional corporation's officers 
and directors (not including the secretary and treasurer) must also be li-
censed (in any state). Id. § 5-1l7(a). Because of the numerous restrictions 
on professional corporations and the availability of other forms of corpo-
rate entities, it is difficult to see why architects would choose to form a 
professional corporation. 
244 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 34 
A licensed architect is authorized to practice architecture through a 
corporation, partnership, or limited liability company.IS Nevertheless, 
a licensed architect is not relieved of any individual liability he or she 
may have regarding the practice of architecture by virtue of his or her 
relationship to a corporation.19 Before a corporation, partnership, or 
limited liability company may perform architectural services, it must 
obtain a permit from the State Board of Architects.2o To be eligible 
for a permit, at least two-thirds of the corporation's directors must be 
licensed in Maryland or another state to practice architecture, engi-
neering, or landscape architecture. 21 The corporation must also des-
ignate at least one "responsible member" who is a director and 
licensed to practice architecture in Maryland.22 
B. The Practice of Professional Engineering 
An individual may practice professional engineering23 in Maryland 
once he or she receives a license to do SO.24 Maryland requires an 
engineer to obtain a license to practice professional engineering in 
order to "safeguard life, health, and property and to promote the pub-
18. MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ. & PROF. § 3-402(a)(I). Additionally, a corpora-
tion, partnership, or limited liability company is permitted to practice ar-
chitecture through a licensed architect. Id. § 3-402(a)(2). 
19. Id. § 3-402 ( c) (2). Similarly, a corporation that practices architecture is not 
relieved of liability for the acts or omissions of its directors, officers, em-
ployees or agents. Id. § 3-402 (c) (1). 
20. Id. § 3-403(a). A corporation may, however, perform architectural services 
for itself or an affiliate without a permit. Id. § 3-403(b). 
21. Id. § 3-404(a), (b)(I). 
22. Id. § 3-404(c). The responsible member is "in charge of architecture prac-
ticed through the corporation." Id. § 3-404 (c) (2). 
23. Id. § 14-30I(a). The practice of professional engineering is defined as: 
[P]rovid[ing] any service or creative work the performance of 
which requires education, training, and experience in the applica-
tion of: 
(i) special knowledge of the mathematical, physical, and engi-
neering sciences; and 
(ii) the principles and methods of engineering analysis and 
design. 
(2) In regard to a building or other structure, machine, equip-
ment, process, works, system, project, or public or private utility, 




(iv) inspection of construction to ensure compliance with 
specifications and drawings; 
(v) investigation; 
(vi) planning; and 
(vii) design coordination. 
Id. § 14-lOI(f) (1)-(2). 
24. Id. § 14-301 (a). 
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lic welfare."25 To be eligible for a license, an individual must meet 
initial requirements26 and pass an examination.27 
Professional engineers have the same options in choosing a corpo-
rate form as architects.28 Unlike a corporation engaged in architec-
ture,29 a corporation which engages in professional engineering is not 
required to obtain a permit.30 
C. Certificate of Qualified Expert Requirement 
When suing a "licensed professional," a claimant is required to file a 
certificate of a qualified expert with the court.31 Failure to file the 
certificate within ninety days after filing the complaint entitles the de-
fendant to dismissal without prejudice.32 Upon request and a showing 
of good cause by the claimant, the court has discretion to waive or 
modifY this requirement.33 The claimant may request otherwise dis-
coverable information which is "reasonably necessary ... to obtain a 
certificate of a qualified expert" within thirty days after the claim is 
served.34 A ninety-day time limit for filing the certificate of a qualified 
expert begins when the defendant complies with the claimant's re-
quest. 35 If the defendant fails to comply with the claimant's request, 
the claimant is excused from the obligation of filing a certificate of a 
qualified expert.36 
The requirement to file a certificate of a qualified expert only per-
tains to civil actions, "originally filed in circuit court against a licensed 
professional," and arising from that professional's negligent act or 
omission in connection with the rendering of professional services.37 
A "licensed professional" is defined as: 
25. Id. § 14-102. This legislative policy is very similar to the state's interest in 
regulating architecture. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
26. MD. CODE ANN., Bus. acc. & PROF. § 14-304. The applicant must be "of 
good character and reputation," and meet certain education requirements. 
Id. § 14-304(b), (c). The education requirement for an applicant may be 
waived if he or she has a significant amount of work experience. Id. ~ 14-
305(a), (d). 
27. Id. § 14-304(c). The examination consists of an eight-hour examination on 
the "fundamentals of engineering" and an eight-hour examination on the 
"principles and practice of engineering." Id. § 14-307(d)(1). 
28. See discussion supra Part II.A. Corporations are authorized to engage in 
professional engineering. MD. CODE ANN., Bus. acc. & PROF. § 14-401 (a). 
The engineer's individual liability is not affected by the fact that he or she 
practices through a corporate form. Id.14-401(c)(2). 
29. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text. 
30. See MD. CODE ANN., Bus. acc. & PROF. §§ 14-101 to 14-602. The Maryland 
Professional Engineers Act does not mention that a permit is required. Id. 
31. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2C-02(a) (2002). 
32. Id. § 3-2C-02(a) (1), (2) (ii). 
33. Id. § 3-2C-02(c)(1). 
34. Id. § 3-2C-02(b) (1). 
35. Id. § 3-2C-02(b)(2). 
36. Id. § 3-2C-02(b) (3). 
37. Id. § 3-2C-01(b) (defining the term "claim"). 
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(1) An architect licensed under Title 3 of the Business Occu-
pations and Professions Article; 
(2) An interior designer certified under Title 8 of the Busi-
ness Occupations and Professions Article; 
(3) A landscape architect licensed under Title 9 of the Busi-
ness Occupations and Professions Article; 
(4) A professional engineer licensed under Title 14 of the 
Business Occupations and Professions Article; or 
(5) A professional land surveyor or property line surveyor li-
censed under Title 15 of the Business Occupations and Pro-
fessions Article. 38 
A "qualified expert" is any individual who is a licensed professional 
in Maryland, or another state, and who is knowledgeable in the stan-
dard of care applicable to the same professional service of the defen-
dant. 39 In spite of this, some individuals who meet the above 
requirement may still not be used as qualified experts.40 A valid certif-
icate requires that the qualified expert attest that the licensed profes-
sional, against whom the claim has been filed, has failed to meet the 
applicable standard of care.41 
D. Other States 
Several other states have a similar requirement for suits against ar-
chitects and engineers. The requirements in California, Colorado, 
and Georgia provide a contrast to the requirements in Maryland.42 
1. California 
An individual who sues a licensed architect, engineer, or land sur-
veyor in California is required to file and serve a certificate.43 This 
certificate must be filed "on or before the date of service of the com-








Id. § 3-2C-Ol(c) (1)-(5). 
Id. § 3-2C-Ol(d)(I). Hence, if someone sued a licensed architect in Mary-
land for professional negligence, the plaintiffs qualified expert would also 
have to be a licensed architect, either in Maryland or another state. Id. 
The plaintiff may not use an unlicensed professional engineer as his quali-
fied expert. Id. 
Id. § 3-2C-Ol (d) (2). Namely, parties to the claim, employees or partners of 
a party to the claim, employees or shareholders of a professional associa-
tion of which a party to the claim is a stockholder, and individuals having a 
financial interest in the outcome of the suit may not act as a qualified ex-
pert. Id. 
Id. § 3-2C-02(a)(2)(i). 
CAL. CIY. PROC. CODE § 411.35 (West 2004); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-20-
602 (West Supp. 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1 (Supp. 2004). For a full 
discussion of this provision, see Robert D. Brussack, Georgia's Professional 
Malpractice Affidavit Requirement, 31 GA. L. REv. 1031 (1997). 
CAL. CIY. PROC. CODE ~ 411.35(a). 
Id. 
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eral requirement, unlike Maryland. 45 Failure to comply with the 
certificate requirement is grounds for a demurrer or a motion to 
strike.46 
The Court of Appeal of California has indicated that the certificate 
requirement is valid in suits against corporate defendants who per-
form architectural services.47 The court did not question or analyze 
whether the certificate requirement applies in cases with corporate 
defendants. The court did state, however, that the section requiring 
the certificate was enacted to prevent frivolous lawsuits.48 
2. Colorado 
Claimants suing acupuncturists or other licensed professionals for 
professional negligence, in Colorado, are required to file a certificate 
of review with the court.49 The certificate of review must be filed 
within sixty days after service of the complaint, unless good cause is 
shown for extending the time limit. 50 Failure to file a certificate of 
review results in dismissal of the complaint.51 
The statute explicitly provides that the certificate of review require-
ments apply to suits against firms.52 The requirement has been held 
to apply when the defendant is a limited liability company,53 and is 
45. In California, the certificate is "executed by the attorney for the plaintiff 
•••• n Id. § 411.35(b). The attorney attests that he or she has consulted 
with a licensed professional, and based on this consultation the attorney 
has determined that in his or her professional judgment, the suit is merito-
rious. Id. § 411.35(b)(I). Alternatively, the attorney may attest that it was 
impossible to consult with a licensed professional before filing the claim 
because the statute of limitations would have expired had the attorney 
done so. Id. § 411.35(b)(2). If the attorney attests to this, the certificate 
must be filed within sixty days after the complaint is filed. Id. In a third 
alternative, the attorney may attest that he or she made three separate, 
good faith attempts to consult with three separate licensed architects, engi-
neers, or land sUlveyors, but none of the individuals would agree to the 
consultation. Id. § 411.35(b)(3). Finally, the requirement is waived if the 
attorney plans to rely solely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor. Id. 
§ 411.35(d). 
46. Id. § 411.35(g). 
47. Ponderosa Ctr. Partners v. McClellan/Cruz/Gaylord & Assocs., 45 Cal. App. 
4th 913 (1996). 
48. Id. at 915. 
49. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-20-602(1)(a) (West Supp. 2003). 
50. Id. 
51. Id. § 13-20-602(4). Unlike California courts, Colorado courts will not waive 
the certificate of review requirement when the plaintiff relies solely on the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitor, "at least when there is no evidence ... that the 
defendant had any control over the instrumentality causing the injury." Bi-
lawsky v. Faseehudin, 916 P.2d 586, 590 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995). 
52. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-20-602(b). 
53. Miller v. Rowtech, LLC, 3 P.3d 492, 494-95 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000) (holding 
the defendant waived the defense that a certificate of review was required 
by waiting until a post-trial motion to raise the issue). 
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required when the defendant is the state government.54 The Su-
preme Court of Colorado held that dismissal is required for failure to 
file a certificate of review when the plaintiff seeks damages against 
either the licensed professional who is named as a party or against the 
professional's employer.55 The court determined that the language of 
the statute was ambiguous as to whether a certificate of review is re-
quired when the state is the defendant.56 To clarify the ambiguity, the 
court found that both the legislative history and legislative purpose 
indicated that the certificate of review requirement applies when the 
suit is against the professional's employer. 57 Therefore, in Colorado, 
corporations, employers and individual licensees have the protection 
of the certificate of review requirement. 
3. Georgia 
In Georgia, a claimant who sues a licensed professional or a health 
care facility is required to attach an affidavit of a person competent to 
testify as an expert to the complaint.58 If preparation of the affidavit 
would cause the statute of limitations to expire, the claimant must 
supplement his claim within forty-five days after filing the complaint.59 
If the affidavit is not filed, the suit is subject to dismissal for failure to 
state a claim.60 Georgia, unlike Maryland, permits the affidavit to be 
filed by the claimant himself.61 
The Supreme Court of Georgia has held that the protection of the 
affidavit requirement extends to architectural firms, as well as to indi-
vidual architects.62 The Court of Appeals of Georgia has also held 
54. Colo. Dep't of Corrs. v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493, 509 (Colo. 2000). Nieto was 
an inmate who sought treatment at the prison medical clinic. [d. at 497-98. 
He alleged that the clinic staff was negligent in his treatment, causing him 
permanent paralysis. [d. at 498. The trial court dismissed Nieto's negli-
gence claim against the treating nurse because he failed to comply with the 
certificate of review requirement in a timely manner. [d. The state, how-
ever, was held liable on the basis of respondeat superior and ordered to pay 
$150,000. [d. at 498-99. The state appealed, but the Colorado Court of 
Appeals held that the certificate of review requirement did not apply to the 
state as an entity since it was not a "licensed professional" within the mean-
ing of the statute. [d. at 496, 499. 
55. [d. at 496. 
56. [d. at 500. 
57. [d. at 502-04. 
58. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1 (a) (Supp. 2004). Architects and engineers are 
specifically listed as professionals to whom the requirement applies. [d. § 9-
11-9.1(£)(1), (19). 
59. [d. § 9-11-9.1 (b). 
60. [d. 
61. Findleyv. Davis, 414 S.E.2d 317, 318 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991). See also supra note 
40 discussing the comparable Maryland requirement. 
62. See HollS. Auth. of Savannah v. Greene, 383 S.E.2d 867 (Ga. 1989), vacated 
in part !Jy 429 S.E.2d 174 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). The Housing Authority of 
Savannah was sued for the wrongful death ofa tenant, who died from expo-
sure to carbon monoxide caused by the faulty design and construction of 
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that engineering firms, when named as defendants, may assert the de-
fense of the plaintiffs failure to file an affidavit. 63 These cases, how-
ever, were decided under a previous version of the current statute, 
and may no longer be applicable.64 
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
This section will first discuss the similarities between the certificate 
of a qualified expert requirements in suits against architects and engi-
neers and those against "health care providers." Next it will discuss, 
the cases that have interpreted the provisions requiring a certificate of 
a qualified expert. This section will also outline the purposes of cor-
porate practice of architecture and engineering, and the legislative 
history behind the certificate of a qualified expert requirement. Fi-
nally, this section will argue that the protection of the certificate of a 
qualified expert should extend to corporations. 
A. Health Care Malpractice Claims 
In addition to architects and engineers, Maryland also mandates 
that a certificate of a qualified expert be filed within ninety days after 
a complaint for claims against health care providers.65 The certificate 
must be filed with the Director of the Health Claims Arbitration Of-
fice. 66 Failure to file a certificate of qualified expert results in dismis-







[A] hospital, a related institution as defined in § 19-301 of 
the Health-General Article, a physician, an osteopath, an op-
tometrist, a chiropractor, a registered or licensed practical 
the heating system. [d. at 868. The Housing Authority filed a third-party 
suit against Gilpin + Bazemore/Architects & Planners, Inc., who designed 
the system. [d. 
S. Eng'g Co. v. Cent. Ga. Elec. Membership Corp., 389 S.E.2d 380, 381 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 395 S.E.2d 809 (Ga. 1990). 
In 1997, the Georgia statute was amended to read: "In any action for dam-
ages alleging professional malpractice against a professional licensed Uy the 
State of Georgia and listed in subsection (f) of this Code section .... " GA. 
CODE ANN. S 9-11-9.1 (a) (emphasis added). Greene and Southern Engineering 
Co. were decided prior to the amendment when the statute read: "In any 
action for damages alleging professional malpractice .... " Greene, 383 
S.E.2d at 867. By limiting the affidavit requirement to only those claims 
against a professional licensed in Georgia, the Georgia legislature may have 
intended to preclude corporations from receiving the protection of the 
affidavit. 
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-04(a) (1), (b)(l)(i) (Supp.2004). 
This requirement is waived if the sole issue is the lack of informed consent. 
[d. § 3-2A-04(b). Further, initial jurisdiction belongs exclusively to the 
Health Claims Arbitration Office. Schwartz v. Lilly, 53 Md. App. 318, 321-
22,452 A.2d 1302, 1304 (1982). 
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-04(b) (1)(i). 
[d. 
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nurse, a dentist, a podiatrist, a psychologist, a licensed certi-
fied social worker-clinical, and a physical therapist, licensed 
or authorized to provide one or more health care services in 
Maryland.68 
The purpose of these provisions is to (1) respond to a perceived 
"malpractice insurance crisis,"69 and (2) "screen malpractice claims, 
[and] ferret out meritless ones.,,70 By requiring a certificate of a quali-
fied expert, the legislature sought to prevent frivolous claims from 
reaching court.71 
In keeping with this goal, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has 
held that a claim against an organization, which is not within the lit-
eral definition of health care provider, is subject to the requirements 
of the Health Care Arbitration Act. 72 Specifically, in Group Health Asso-
ciation v. Blumenthal,73 the court found that a health management or-
ganization (HMO) did not fall within the meaning of a health care 
provider. 74 Because the plaintiffs' suit against the HMO was founded 
on the doctrine of respondeat superior,75 the court held that the suit 
was bound by the provisions of the Health Care Malpractice Claims 
Statute.76 The court also looked to the legislative history of the act, 
thereby gleaning legislative intent.77 By construing the statute in such 
a way that the certificate of a qualified expert and arbitration provi-
sions would cover as many suits as possible, the court gave effect to the 
legislature's intent to "establish a 'mechanism to screen malpractice 
claims prior to the filing of suit.' "78 
Similarly, Maryland courts should construe the provisions requiring 
a certificate of a qualified expert in suits against architects and engi-
68. Id. § 3-2A-Ol(e) (Supp.2004). 
69. Bovey v. Executive Dir., 292 Md. 640, 641, 441 A.2d 333, 334 (1982). 
70. Adler v. Hyman, 334 Md. 568, 575, 640 A.2d 1100, 1103 (1994) (citing 
Group Health Ass'n v. Blumenthal, 295 Md. 104, 113,453 A.2d 1198, 1204 
(1983» . 
71. See id. 
72. Group Health Ass'n, 295 Md. at 112, 453 A.2d at 1203. Group Health Associ-
ation (hereinafter "GHA") was a health management organization, of 
which Blumenthal was a member. Id. at 105-06, 453 A.2d at 1200-01. Mter 
informing GHA that she believed she was pregnant, Blumenthal received 
prenatal care from several GHA employees. Id. at 106, 453 A.2d at 1201. 
Mter the employees gave her allegedly negligent care, Blumenthal sought 
to bypass the Health Care Malpractice Claims Statute and sue GHA in fed-
eral district court based on diversity of citizenship. Id. at 107-08, 453 A.2d 
at 1201. 
73. 295 Md. 104,453 A.2d 1198 (1983). 
74. Id. at 110, 453 A.2d at 1203. 
75. Since the HMO itself could not have committed a negligent act (as it is a 
legal fiction), in suits against it for the negligent acts of its employees, it 
should be entitled to the same treatment that the employee would receive. 
76. Id. at Ill, 453 A.2d at 1203. 
77. Id. at 112-13, 453 A.2d at 1203-04. 
78. See id. at 113, 453 A.2d at 1204 (citation omitted). 
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neers to encompass claims against corporations. Although a corpora-
tion does not fit precisely within the definition of a licensed 
professional,79 the courts should follow the Court of Appeals' decision 
in Group Health Association to broaden the scope of the statute to en-
compass as many claims as possible and effectuate the legislative 
intent.8o 
B. Court Decisions Interpreting MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. 
§§ 3-2C-01 and 3-2C-02 
1. Baltimore County v. RTKL Associates, Inc. 81 
On April 9, 2004, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a 
corporate defendant practicing architecture or engineering was not 
entitled to the protections of the certificate of a qualified expert re-
quirement.82 In April of 1996, Baltimore County, Maryland ("Balti-
more County"), entered into a contract with RTKL Associates, Inc. 
(RTKL) for RTKL to provide certain engineering and construction 
services for Phase I of the Dundee-Saltpeter Environmental Park, a 
future education center.83 RTKL retained Andrews, Miller & Associ-
ates (AMA) to provide "engineering services associated with the grad-
ing of the property."84 AMA apparently completed its work under the 
contract in 1998.85 In 1999, Baltimore County discovered that the 
benchmarks AMA had set were inaccurate.86 This caused substantial 
damages and delays, as more dirt had to be brought in to remedy the 
problem; foundation walls, already in place, had to be changed; wall 
panels had to be disassembled; additional concrete had to be laid; and 
the slab of the grade had to be changed.87 
Baltimore County brought suit against RTKL and AMA in August of 
2001, alleging breach of contract and negligence.88 RTKL and AMA 
79. In this context a licensed professional is defined as "[a]n architect licensed 
under Title 3 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article." MD. 
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2G01(c)(l) (2001). A corporation can 
never be a licensed architect since a licensed architect is an individual who 
is licensed to practice architecture in Maryland. MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ. 
& PROF. § 3-101(b), (i) (2004). 
80. These aspects of the law will be discussed in greater detail infra Parts III.D 
and I1I.E. 
81. 380 Md. 670, 846 A.2d 433 (2004). 
82. Id. at 690, 846 A.2d at 445. 
83. Id. at 672, 846 A.2d at 434. SpeCifically, RTKL was to "provide design devel-
opment, construction documents, and bid assistance." Id. 
84. Id. at 672-73, 846 A.2d at 434 (internal quotes omitted). 
85. Id. at 673, 846 A.2d at 434. The court notes that "the record is not entirely 
clear on this point." Id. 
86. Id. Specifically, the benchmarks were inaccurate by 0.092 feet, and hence 
"all grading of dirt was done 0.092 feet too low." Id. (internal quotes 
omitted). 
87. Id. at 673, 846 A.2d at 434-35. 
88. Id. at 673, 846 A.2d at 435. 
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moved to dismiss, alleging that the suit was subject to arbitration and 
had not been filed within the statute of limitations.89 The circuit 
court denied the defendants' motion concerning arbitration, "but did 
not expressly rule on the limitations issue."90 RTKL and AMA filed an 
interlocutory appeal asking the Court of Special Appeals to rule on 
both issues.91 The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court 
with regard to arbitration, but held "that no interlocutory appeal lay 
from [the circuit court's] implied ruling on the limitations issue."92 
On remand to the circuit court, RTKL and AMA again moved to 
dismiss based on the statute oflimitations and Baltimore County's fail-
ure to comply with the certificate of a qualified expert requirement.93 
The circuit court denied the defendants' motion as it related to the 
certificate of a qualified expert requirement, but granted the motions 
to dismiss as to the limitations issue.94 The circuit court held that the 
certificate of a qualified expert requirement only applied to suits 
against individual licensed professionals, not corporations.95 Both the 
plaintiff and the defendants appealed the court's ruling.96 The Court 
of Appeals then granted certiorari on its own initiative, taking the case 
before the Court of Special Appeals had an opportunity to consider 
the issues.97 
The court devoted approximately ninety-three percent of its discus-
sion to the statute of limitations issue, devoting less than one page to 
the issue of the certificate of a qualified expert requirement.98 RTKL 
and AMA based their arguments largely on an unpublished decision 
by the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland.99 The court 
held that the certificate of a qualified expert requirement applied 
only to individuals, because the statute defined "licensed professional" 
as "an architect licensed under Title 3 of the Business Occupations 
and Professions Article" or a "professional engineer licensed under 
Title 14" of the same Article.1Oo The court then noted that the Busi-
ness Occupations and Professions Article "makes clear that only an 
89. Id. The defendants relied on the applicable statute of limitations in suits 
naming a county as a defendant, however, in the present case, the county 
was the plaintiff. Id. at 677, 846 A.2d at 437. 








98. See id. at 674-90, 846 A.2d at 435-45. 
99. Id. at 689-90, 846 A.2d at 444-45. Specifically, RTKL and AMA relied on 
Ferrell v. American Property Construction Company. Id. at 690, 846 A.2d at 445. 
This case is discussed infra Part III.B.4. 
100. Id. at 690, 846 A.2d at 445 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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individual may be licensed as an architect" or engineer.101 The court 
also found this restriction was necessary, because specified education 
and completion of an examination is required to become a licensed 
professional. 102 The court therefore held that only individuals may be 
licensed, and the circuit court had correctly decided the issue.103 
The Court of Appeals' cursory approach to this issue demonstrates 
that the court failed to consider several issues in its ruling. While the 
court devoted fifteen pages to the issue of limitations, it devoted less 
than one page to the issue of the certificate of a qualified expert re-
quirement. 104 The court did not cite any legislative history or the pur-
pose of the statute in construing the certificate of a qualified expert 
requirement. 105 The court also did not layout the possible implica-
tions of its ruling, nor did it address the implications if it were to rule 
in the alternative. 106 The court did not even entertain the possibility 
that the statute was ambiguous.107 Despite not dealing with these is-
sues, in the very same opinion, the court laid out its professed test for 
interpreting statutes: to give effect to legislative intent by looking at 
the plain meaning, the legislative history, and the legal effect of com-
peting constructions.108 The court thus gave extensive treatment to 
the words "claim" and "claimant" in the statute of limitations, but no 
more than a fleeting analysis of the certificate of a qualified expert 
requirement. IOg Even though the court was erroneous in this deci-
sion, the court has demonstrated that it is willing to reverse itself upon 
a showing that its prior rulings were fallacious interpretations of the 
law. 110 
2. Heritage Harbour, L.L. C. v. John J Reynolds, Inc. lll 
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland has also had the opportu-
nity to review whether a corporation is entitled to receive the protec-
tion offered by the certificate of a qualified expert requirement. 112 In 
late 1998, the Council of Unit Owners of South River Condominium 




104. Id. at 674-90, 846 A.2d at 435-45. 
105. See id. at 689-90, 846 A.2d at 444-45. 
106. See id. 
107. See id. 
108. Id. at 678, 846 A.2d at 437-38. 
109. Id. at 674-90, 846 A.2d at 435-45. 
110. See Harris v. Bd. of Educ., 375 Md. 21, 59, 825 A.2d 365, 387-88 (2003) 
(overruling a line of cases that read language into the worker's compensa-
tion statutes that did not belong there). 
111. 143 Md. App. 698, 795 A.2d 806 (2002). It should be noted that the Court 
of Appeals, in Baltimore County v. RTKL Associates Inc., did not cite Heritage 
Harbour, L.L.G. at all. 380 Md. 670, 846 A.2d 433. 
112. Heritage Harbour, L.L.G., 143 Md. App. at 708-09, 795 A.2d at 812. 
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fendants ("appellants"), alleging various defects in the construction of 
the condominiums.113 The appellants then filed a complaint for con-
tribution and indemnification against John J. Reynolds, Inc., and sev-
eral other defendants ("appellees")Y4 Several of the appellees filed 
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, many of which were 
granted. 115 
In Heritage Harbour, L.L.G., the appellants did not timely file a certif-
icate of a qualified expert as to any of the appellees. 116 Without in-
quiring into whether the certificate of a qualified expert applies to 
corporate defendants, the court agreed with the appellees that failure 
to so file entitled the appellees to dismissal of the suit. 117 Although 
the court reached the proper conclusion, it did not give enough anal-
ysis as to why a corporation offering professional services should be 
extended the same level of protection as an individual architect or 
engineer. 
3. Adams v. NVR Homes, Inc. 11S 
Adams was decided in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Marylandy9 Seventeen families ("plaintiffs"), who were re-
sidents of the Calvert Ridge development in Elkridge, Maryland, 
brought suit against various corporations and individuals for conceal-
ing the fact that the plaintiffs' homes were built on a solid waste 
dump.12o Some of these defendants l21 filed third party claims against 
Gutschick-a civil engineering, surveying, and planning firm-for in-
demnity based on Gutschick's alleged breach of contract and negli-
gence in providing civil engineering services. 122 Gutschick moved for 
summary judgment, based in part on the third-party plaintiffs' failure 
to comply with the certificate of a qualified expert requirement. 123 
In deciding the issue, the court first stated that the claim against 
Gutschick was not a "claim" within the meaning of the statute because 
the suit was not originally instituted in a Maryland circuit court. 124 
113. Id. at 702, 795 A.2d at 808. In total, there were seven of these defendants. 
Id. 
114. Id. at 703, 795 A.2d at 808-09. There were eighteen of these defendants. 
Id. (not all of these defendants joined in the appeal considered in Heritage 
Harbour, L.L. G.). A number of these parties were architectural or engineer-
ing firms. Id. 
115. Id. at 703-04, 795 A.2d at 809. 
116. Id. at 708, 795 A.2d at 812. 
117. Id. at 708-09, 795 A.2d at 812. 
118. 135 F. Supp. 2d 675 (D. Md. 2001). 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 679-80. 
121. Brantley Development and Nantucket (developers and marketers of the 
homes). Id. at 679-81. 
122. Id. at 712-13. 
123. See id. at 716. 
124. Id. 
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The court also held that Gutschick, as an engineering firm and not an 
individual, would not qualify as a licensed professional. 125 Based, in 
part, on the fact that only licensed professionals are entitled to the 
protection offered by the certificate of a qualified expert requirement, 
and Gutschick is not a licensed professional, the court denied their 
motion for summary judgment. 126 
This court reached an improper conclusion in Adams much the 
same way the Court of Appeals did in RTKL Associates. The court con-
strued the statute much too narrowly and did not consider legislative 
intent.127 Instead, it read the statute literally, without taking into ac-
count the inherent ambiguity in the statute and the effect of such a 
narrow interpretation.128 Further, the decision can be distinguished 
from any reported case decided in Maryland, as one of the court's 
reasons for denying Gutschick's motion was that the claim was not 
originally filed in a Maryland circuit court.129 Hence, its statement 
that the certificate of a qualified expert requirement does not apply to 
suits against engineering firms can be viewed as dictum.13o 
4. Ferrell v. American Property Construction CO. 131 
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland, in Fer-
rell v. American Property Construction Co., directly addressed the issue of 
whether a firm is entitled to the protection offered by the certificate 
of a qualified expert requirement. 132 The court first applied the 
Eriel 33 doctrine, and, relying on two cases from other federal circuits 
dealing with similar issues, found that the certificate of a qualified ex-
pert requirement applied to suits filed in federal court.134 The court 
also cited a Fourth Circuit decision, which held that the Maryland 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. See infra Part III.D (discussing legislative intent). 
128. See infra Parts III.D-E (discussing the ambiguity present in the statute, the 
effects of such ambiguity, and the effects of this erroneous interpretation). 
129. Adams, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 716. 
130. See id. In other words, by ruling that the certificate of a qualified expert 
requirement does not apply because the case was not instituted in a Mary-
land circuit court, the court did not need to answer the question of 
whether Gutschick would otherwise be entitled to such protection because 
of its status as a firm. The first decision was all that was necessary to deny 
Gutschick's motion for summary judgment. 
13l. Civil Action No. WMN-02-1131 (D. Md. Aug. 15,2003) (mem.). 
132. Id. at 1, 3. In this case, the party that sought dismissal because of the claim-
ant's failure to comply with the certificate of a qualified expert requirement 
was a partnership, not a corporation. Id. at l. Furthermore, the partner-
ship was engaged in architecture, not engineering. Id. 
133. See generally Erie RR v. Tompkins, 304 U.s. 64 (1938). 
134. Ferrell, C.A. No. WMN-02-113l. 
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Health Care Malpractice Claims Act applied to cases filed in federal 
court. 135 
The court discredited Adams by holding that partnerships engaged 
in architecture are entitled to the protection offered by the certificate 
of a qualified expert requirement.136 To reach this decision, the court 
relied on Group Health Association v. Blumenthal. 137 The court found 
that, similar to Group Health Association, liability could only be imposed 
on the partnership on the basis of respondeat superior.138 Hence, the 
firm should be given the protection of the certificate of a qualified 
expert requirement. 
The court in Ferrell reached the correct conclusion, but for the 
wrong reason. Instead of basing its decision on respondeat superior, 
the court should have looked to legislative intent to determine that 
architectural firms are entitled to the protection offered by the certifi-
cate of a qualified expert. By basing its decision on respondeat supe-
rior, the court muddles the issue of whether a firm is entitled to the 
protection of the certificate of a qualified expert requirement. Re-
spondeat superior liability only arises when an employee commits a 
tort while acting within the scope of his employment.139 For the tor-
tious conduct to be considered "within the scope of employment," the 
acts must be "in furtherance of the employer's business and ... 'au-
thorized' by the employer."14o In order for a corporation to gain the 
protection of the certificate of a qualified expert requirement under 
this interpretation of the statute, the corporation would need to prove 
that liability, if it existed, was based on respondeat superior. l41 By im-
porting this aspect of general tort law into the issue of the certificate 
of a qualified expert protection for firms, the court has only compli-
cated the issue. 
135. Ferrell, C.A. No. WMN-02-1131 at 4-5 (citing Davison v. Sinai Hosp. of Balt., 
Inc., 617 F.2d 361, 362 (4th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), aff'g 462 F. Supp. 778 
(D. Md. 1978)). 
136. [d. at 7. 
137. [d. at 6-7. Group Health Ass'n v. Blumenthal, 295 Md. 104,453 A.2d 1198 
(1983). This case is discussed in detail supra Part III.A. 
138. Ferrell, C. A. No. WMN-02-1131 at 7. 
139. Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 30, 660 A.2d 423, 426 (1995). If liability is 
founded on the doctrine of respondeat superior, the employee and the 
employer are jointly and severally liable to the claimant. S. Mgmt. Corp. v. 
Taha, 378 Md. 461, 481, 836 A.2d 627, 638 (2003); see also DiPino v. Davis, 
354 Md. 18, 47-48, 729 A.2d 354, 369-70 (1999) (suggesting that an ag-
grieved party may hold either a police officer or her employer liable for the 
officer's tortious conduct, assuming the officer acted in a proprietary or 
private capacity). 
140. Sawyer v. Humphries, 322 Md. 247, 255, 587 A.2d 467, 470 (1991). 
141. Nevertheless, if the corporation were able to prove that the employee acted 
outside of his or her employment, the corporation could not be held liable 
for the alleged negligence of the employee. See Oaks, 339 Md. at 30, 660 
A.2d at 426. 
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C. The Purpose of the Corporate Practice of Architecture and Engineering 
The practice of architecture or engineering through a corporation 
is permitted in Maryland. 142 The stockholders of the corporation are 
largely relieved of all debts owed by the corporation to outside credi-
tors of the corporation, including creditors in tort. 143 Maryland 
courts also consider a corporation a separate entity, independent of 
its shareholders.144 However, when an individual practices architec-
ture or engineering through a corporation, and that individual is a 
stockholder, he or she is not relieved of any personal liability related 
to the negligent performance of the professional service. 145 Hence, 
the incentive to practice architecture or engineering through a corpo-
rate form is significantly less than the incentive for other non-profes-
sional industries. Nevertheless, the architect or engineer would still 
probably prefer to incorporate, as it would relieve him or her of per-
sonal liability for certain debts of the corporation, which are not in-
volved with the practice of architecture, such as a lease on office space 
or contracts with suppliers. 146 
Additionally, incorporation is a popular way in which a business can 
raise capital through the sale of equity securities. 147 Although archi-
tectural firms may choose to raise capital by the sale of equity securi-
ties, the composition of the boards of directors of such corporations 
face restrictions not present in traditional corporations.148 Further-
more, if the corporation practicing architecture or engineering incor-
porated as a professional service corporation,149 only individuals 
142. MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ. & PROF. § 3-402(a) (2004) (architecture); § 14-
401 (a) (engineering). 
143. See Damazo v. Wah by, 259 Md. 627,633,270 A.2d 814,817 (1970). Stock-
holders may, however, be held liable under Maryland's version of the pierc-
ing the corporate veil doctrine "to prevent fraud or enforce a paramount 
equity." Id. at 633-34, 270 A.2d at 817. For a full discussion of the limited 
liability protections offered by incorporation, see Larry E. Ribstein, Limited 
Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REv. 80 (1991). 
144. Fuller v. Horvath, 42 Md. App. 671, 684, 402 A.2d 134, 142 (1979). 
145. MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ. & PROF. § 3-402 (c) (2) (architecture); § 14-
401(c)(2) (engineering). 
146. See MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ. & PROF. § 3-402 (c) (2) (architecture); § 14-
401(c)(2) (engineering). 
147. See How the Stock Market Works, at http://www.ameritrade.com/educa 
tionv2/fhtml/stockmarket/ipos.fhtml (last visited Oct. 25, 2004) (describ-
ing how corporations raise capital through the sale of stock, including a 
description of underwriting). 
148. To be eligible for a permit, a corporation practicing architecture must have 
at least two-thirds of its directors licensed in any state to practice architec-
ture. MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ. & PROF. § 3-404(b) (1). Also, the responsi-
ble member in charge of the practice must be a Maryland-licensed architect 
and a director of the corporation. Id. § 3-404(c). Firms practicing profes-
sional engineering do not have similar requirements. 
149. MD. CODE ANN., CORPs. & AsS'NS §§ 5-101(g), S-102(a) (1999) (defining a 
professional service). 
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licensed to provide that same service may be stockholders. I5o Also, a 
corporate form becomes a necessity when revenues grow large. I51 
D. The Legislative History Behind the Certificate of a Qualified Expert 
Requirement 
The statutes requiring a certificate of a qualified expert in suits 
against architects, engineers, and other professionals, was enacted in 
1998. Similar bills were introduced in 1996 and 1997, but both mea-
sures failed. 152 Various professional societies voiced support for the 
bill, including the Maryland Society of Surveyors,I53 the Maryland 
Chapter of the American Society of Landscape Architects,I54 the Mary-
land Society of the American Institute of Architects,155 the Maryland 
section of the American Society of Civil Engineers,156 and the Consult-
ing Engineers Council of Metropolitan Washington. I57 Additionally, 
150. Id. § 5-109(a). This limitation on the option of who may own stock in the 
corporation is the principal reason it makes little sense to incorporate an 
architectural or engineering corporation as a professional service corpora-
tion. See supra note 17. 
151. In Maryland, the corporate form provides a formalized management struc-
ture. See generally MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & AsS'NS § 2-401 (directors); § 2-
412 (officers); § 2-507 (stockholders). This formal structure is the only fea-
sible way to ensure all stockholders' interests are protected when revenues 
and operations grow large, as it provides the stockholders with control over 
the election of directors. The directors in tum, run the affairs of the corpo-
ration and, unless otlIerwise provided, appoint the officers, who act pursu-
ant to powers granted to tlIem by the bylaws and or resolutions of the board 
of directors. Id. § 2-404(b) (1) (stockholders' votes determine who the di-
rectors will be); § 2-401 (directors run the affairs of the corporation); § 2-
413(a) (directors appoint officers); § 2-414(a) (1)-(2) (powers of officers). 
152. JUDIClARyCOMM., BILL ANALYSIS, H.D. 412-188 (Md, 1998) (on file with the 
author). The 1996 bill required the certificate to contain a statement that 
the defendant's failure to meet tlIe standard of care caused the plaintiff's 
injuries. Id. The 1997 bill omitted this requirement and was passed by the 
House of Delegates, but the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee failed 
to issue a report. Id. 
153. Letter from Charles A. Irish, Jr., President, Maryland Society of Surveyors, 
to Delegate Joseph Vallario, Chairman, Judicial Proceedings Committee 
(Mar. 9, 1998) (on file with the author). 
154. Letter from Charles Brenton, Chairman of Legislative Affairs, Maryland 
Chapter, American Society of Landscape Architects, to Delegate Joseph Val-
lario, Chairman, Judicial Proceedings Committee (Mar. 9, 1998) (on file 
with the author). 
155. Letter from Peter Horton, Legislative Chairman, Maryland Society of the 
American Institute of Architects, to Delegate Anne Marie Doory, Vice 
Chairman, House Judiciary Committee (Mar. 10, 1998) (on file with the 
author). 
156. Letter from Daniel T. Cheng, President, Maryland Section of tlIe American 
Society of Civil Engineers, to Delegate Joseph Vallario, Chairman, Judicial 
Proceedings Committee (Feb. 20, 1998) (on file with the author). 
157. Letter from Consulting Engineers Council of Metropolitan Washington, to 
Delegate Joseph Vallario, Chairman, Judicial Proceedings Committee (Mar. 
11, 1998) (on file with tlIe author). 
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the Carroll County,15S Queen Anne's County,159 and MaryiandI60 
Chambers of Commerce all supported the legislation. VIKA Incorpo-
rated, a corporation offering engineering, planning, landscape archi-
tectural, surveying, and global positioning services also voiced support 
for the bill. 16I The Maryland Department of Highway Transportation, 
State Highway Administration, did not take a position on the bill, 
pending the possible insertion of language that would waive the certif-
icate of a qualified expert requirement when government entities 
were concerned. 162 The law firm of Freishtat & Sandler is the only 
entity whose opposition to the bill has been recorded in the legislative 
history.163 There are no indications in the legislative history whether 
the bill's protection was meant to extend to corporate practice of ar-
chitecture or engineering. 
In the eyes of its supporters, the primary intent of the bill was to 
protect design professionals from frivolous lawsuits.164 Secondary 
considerations included: (1) the enhanced competitive position of 
Maryland design professionals by decreasing the cost of insurance and 
158. Letter from Helen C. Utz, Executive Director, Carroll County Chamber of 
Commerce, to Delegate Joseph Vallario, Chairman, Judicial Proceedings 
Committee (Feb. 10, 1998) (on file with the author). 
159. Letter from Robert R. Miller, Chairman, Legislative Committee of the 
Queen Anne's County Chamber of Commerce, to Delegate Joseph Vallario, 
Chairman, Judicial Proceedings Committee (Feb. 16, 1998) (on file with 
the author). 
160. Memorandum from the Maryland Chamber of Commerce, to the Judiciary 
Committee (Mar. 11, 1998) (on file with the author). 
161. Letter from Charles A. Irish, Jr., Executive Vice President, VIKA Incorpo-
rated, to Delegate Joseph Vallario, Chairman, Judicial Proceedings Com-
mittee (Mar. 9, 1998) (on file with the author). 
162. Letter from Elizabeth L. Homer, Deputy Administrator, Maryland Depart-
ment of Transportation, State Highway Administration, to Delegate Joseph 
Vallario, Chairman, Judicial Proceedings Committee (Mar. 11, 1998) (on 
file with the author). 
163. Letter from David Freishtat, Attorney, Freishtat & Sandler, to Delegate Jo-
seph Vallario, Chairman, Judicial Proceedings Committee (Mar. 2, 1998) 
(on file with the author). Mr. Freishtat objected because he was concerned 
that (1) the bill violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution 
and Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, (2) the bill's anti-
consumer consequences outweighed its purposes, (3) the 20% limitation 
on professional activities imposed upon an expert to qualify to issue a certif-
icate of a qualified expert was arbitrary, abusive, and provided an unfair 
advantage to some defendants. Id. 
164. E.g., Letter from Peter Horton, Legislative Chairman, Maryland Society of 
the American Institute of Architects, to Delegate Anne Marie Doory, Vice 
Chairman, House Judiciary Committee (Mar. 10, 1998) (on file with the 
author) ("The proposed bill is designed to deter meritless lawsuits against 
licensed professionals .... "). 
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administrative time,165 (2) a reduction in court congestion,166 and (3) 
job creation.167 
E. The Purpose of the Legislation is Best Served by Extending the Protection 
of a Certificate of a Qualified Expert Requirement to Corporations Practic-
ing Architecture and Engineering 
To adequately serve the purpose of the certificate of a qualified ex-
pert requirement, the Court of Appeals of Maryland should reverse its 
recent decision and extend the protection of the certificate of a quali-
fied expert to corporations practicing architecture and engineering. 
The danger of not extending the protection may be seen from the 
following hypothetical. 
A consumer, C, retains an architectural corporation, AC, to provide 
architectural services. AC designates designer, D, as the architect in 
charge of the project. Mter completion of the project, C is unhappy 
with the results and contemplates suing for professional negligence. 
C can sue either D (as an individual) or AC (as a corporation) .168. As-
suming that C's claim is groundless and that no other licensed archi-
tect would file a certificate of a qualified expert on C's behalf, C's 
meritless claim against D could not continue.169 But by refusing this 
protection to AC, C could continue her suit, on the same set of facts 
creating a meritless suit, against AC. 
Because the plaintiff in a professional malpractice suit can choose 
whether to sue the individual architect who performed the work, or 
the architectural corporation that employs the individual architect,170 
it is only equitable that the corporation should have the same protec-
165. E.g., Letter from Charles Brenton, Chairman, Legislative Affairs, Maryland 
Chapter of the American Society of Landscape Architects, to Delegate Jo-
seph Vallario, Chairman, Judicial Proceedings Committee (Mar. 9, 1998) 
(on file with the author) (the bill will allow" Ll] andscape [a] rchitects prac-
ticing in Maryland [to] anticipate reductions to overhead costs such as in-
surance and administrative time."). 
166. E.g., Letter from Robert R. Miller, Chairman, Legislative Committee, 
Queen Anne's County Chamber of Commerce, to Delegate Joseph Vallario, 
Chairman, Judicial Proceedings Committee (Feb. 16, 1998) (on file with 
the author) ("The passage of this bill would help eliminate many frivolous 
lawsuits which take so much of our courts' available time."). 
167. E.g., Letter from Consulting Engineers Council of Metropolitan Washing-
ton, to Delegate Joseph Vallario, Chairman, Judicial Proceedings Commit-
tee (Mar. 11, 1998) (on file with the author) (the bill will "return 
productive time and revenue to professional services, thereby creating 
jobs."). 
168. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
169. See MD. CODE fum., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 3-2C-02(a) (1) (2002). If Cis una-
ble to obtain a certificate of a qualified expert, the claim against the indi-
vidual architect is dismissed without prejudice. Id. 
170. Supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
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tion available to the individual. l7l Given that courts should endeavor 
to apply legislative intent when construing statutes,172 the only suc-
cessful way to further the intent of preventing frivolous suits for archi-
tectural or engineering malpractice is to extend the protection of the 
certificate of a qualified expert requirement to suits against corpora-
tions engaged in architecture or engineering. 
Many architects and engineers in Maryland are employed by corpo-
rations. As of 1997, the Census Bureau reported 378 employer archi-
tectural firms with 2,372 employees and 1,375 employer professional 
engineering firms with 30,901 employees operating in Maryland. 173 
These numbers can be compared to the 887 non-employer architec-
tural firms 174 and 1,830 non-employer professional engineering 
firms.175 With such substantial numbers of architects and professional 
171. The above hypothetical is equally applicable to engineers and corporations 
engaged in engineering. Supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
172. Pack Shack, Inc. v. Howard County, 371 Md. 243, 253, 808 A.2d 795, 800 
(2002). 
173. Economic Census, 1997, Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services, Maryland, 
at http://www.census.gov/epcd/ec97/md/MDOOO_54.HTM (Page gener-
ated Sept. 23, 2003) [hereinafter Economic Census] (on file with the author). 
One cannot assume that all of these employees are licensed architects or 
professional engineers (as some of them are undoubtedly unlicensed sup-
port personnel). In 2002, the twenty-five largest architectural firms in the 
Baltimore area (ranked by billings originating from Baltimore-area offices) 
employed 428 architects. Largest Architecture Firms in the Baltimare Area, BALT. 
Bus. j., Dec. 19, 2003, at 126 (hereinafter Largest Architecture Firms). The 
local offices of these firms employed a total of 1,409 non-architects. [d. 
Eliminating the outlier (URS Corporation employed eleven architects and 
650 other staff in its Hunt Valley, Maryland office), this equates to 759 sup-
port staff, or a ratio of approximately 0.549 architects per staff member of 
any designation. [d. Assuming this ratio is accurate for all employer archi-
tectural firms, the author estimates that approximately 1,302 architects 
practice through corporations in Maryland. [d.; see also Economic Census, 
supra. Further, the 2002 billings of the largest architectural firms in the 
Baltimore area exceeded $186 million. Largest Architecture Firms, supra, at 
126. Likewise, the twenty-five largest engineering firms in the Baltimore 
area employ 676 local engineers (with the largest firm, Parsons Brincker-
hoff, not reporting). [d. at 128. Unfortunately, the statistics regarding the 
ratio of engmeers to other local staff is reported in a different fashion, and 
a similar analysis to that employed for architectural firms cannot be used. 
Moreover, the twenty-five largest engineering firms reported local billings 
of more than $460 million. [d. 
174. Nonemployer Statistics, 1998, Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services, Mary-
land, at http://www.census.gov/ epcd/nonemployer/1998/md/MDOOO_54. 
HTM (last modified Sept. 23, 2003). 
175. [d. 
Non-employer firm data is primarily comprised of sole proprietor-
ship businesses filing IRS Form 1040, Schedule C, although some 
of the data is derived from filers of partnership and corporation tax 
returns that report no paid employees. This data undergoes com-
plex processing, editing, and analytical review at the Census Bu-
reau to distinguish nonemployers from employers, correct and 
complete data items, and form the final nonemployer universe. 
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engineers practicing through corporations and generating such enor-
mous billings, the above-described hypothetical demonstrates that the 
legislative purpose behind the certificate of a qualified expert require-
ment would be defeated by refusing its protection to corporations. 
Further, a refusal to permit corporations engaged in the practice of 
architecture and professional engineering to e~oy the protection of-
fered by the certificate of a qualified expert requirement may violate 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.176 The 
Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state is permitted to "deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws."177 By granting protection to individuals, but not to corpora-
tions, both of which practice in the same field, the statute may be in 
violation of the United States Constitution; in such circumstances, 
courts should interpret statutes in a manner that is consistent with the 
Constitution.178 It is undoubted that corporations enjoy some consti-
tutional right to equal protection.179 By granting an extraordinary 
protection to individuals, the requirement of a certificate of merit, a 
narrow reading of the statute may require that it be invalidated as 
denying equal protection to corporations engaged in the same 
activity. 
F. Arguments Against Extending the Protection of the Certificate of a Quali-
fied Expert Requirement to Corporations 
The primary argument against extending the protection of the cer-
tificate of a qualified expert requirement to corporations is the plain 
language of the statute. The statute defines a licensed professional as 
a licensed architectI80 or professional engineer. 181 A corporation, 
necessarily, cannot obtain a license to practice either of these profes-
sions. 182 While courts endeavor to give effect to legislative intent, 
their primary tool for divining such intent is the words of the statute 









Purpose and Use of Nonemplayer Statistics, at http://www.census.gov / epcd/ 
nonemployer/view/intro.html (revised Sept. 8, 2004). 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § l. 
[d. 
See Pub. Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 465-66 
(1989) (noting that when possible, statutes enacted by Congress should be 
interpreted such that they do not violate the Constitution). 
See generally Pembina Conso!. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 
125 U.S. 181, 188-89' (1888). The Court determined that equal protection 
concerns arose when one state charged a tax on corporations formed in 
another state. [d. 
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2C-Ol (c)(l) (2002). 
[d. § 3-2C-Ol(c)(4). 
MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ. & PROF. § 3-101 (b) (2004) (architecture); § 14-
101(h) (engineering). 
Pack Shack, Inc. v. Howard County, 371 Md. 243, 253, 808 A.2d 795, 801 
(2002). 
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the words of the statute,184 Maryland courts will also consider the 
"purpose, goal, or context of the statute" in effectuating the intent of 
the legislature. 185 The purpose of the statute is to ~revent frivolous 
malpractice claims against architects and engineers,l 6 a purpose that 
can only be effectively served by extending the protection of the stat-
ute to corporations.187 Moreover, the strict construction of the statute 
by the Court of Appeals defeats the purpose of the statute; because so 
many architects and engineers practice through corporations and so 
many millions of dollars are generated by that practice each year. 18S 
The above hypothetical demonstrates how plaintiffs with meritless 
claims can bypass the statute. 
Another argument against extending the protection of the certifi-
cate of a qualified expert requirement to corporations is that the indi-
vidual architects in a corporation should pay some price for gaining 
limited liability. An architect who incorporates his practice and is a 
shareholder gains the benefit of limited liability for the debts of the 
corporation. 189 In exchange for this, the architect or professional en-
gineer should lose the protection offered him by the certificate of a 
qualified expert requirement, at least as it relates to the corporation's 
practice. The United States Supreme Court has held that a corpora-
tion does not enjoy the same protections under the United States 
Constitution as a natural person.190 The issue of whether protections 
offered by the Constitution are available to corporations, however, 
"depends on the nature, history, and purpose of the particular consti-
tutional provision."191 Even putting aside the fact that the protection 
offered by the certificate of a qualified expert requirement is not con-
stitutional in nature, the "nature, history and purpose" of the provi-
sion is clearly to prevent frivolous lawsuits asserting professional 
design negligence.192 Hence, the fact that a corporation is not a natu-
ral person should not prevent it from receiving this particular 
protection. 
184. Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995). 
185. Prince George's County v. Vieira, 340 Md. 651, 658, 667 A.2d 898, 901 
(1995). 
186. Supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
187. See supra Part I1LE. 
188. Supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text. 
189. See Damazo v. Wahby, 259 Md. 627, 633, 270 A.2d 814, 817 (1970). Al-
though for those practicing architecture or professional engineering, liabil-
ity for negligence relating to the rendering of professional services is not 
limited by virtue of incorporation. MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ. & PROF. § 3-
402(c)(2) (2004) (architecture); § 14-401 (c)(2) (engineering). 
190. Okla. Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 204-06 (1946). Specifically, 
the Court noted that corporations are not entitled to the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination. Id. 
191. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978). 
192. Supra Part III.D. 
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G. Arguments Against Extending the Protection of the Certificate of a Quali-
fied Expert Requirement to Corporations Practicing Professional 
Engineering 
Unlike corporations practicing architecture,193 corporations that of-
fer professional engineering services are not required to obtain a per-
mit from the Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation. 194 
Some may argue that, because a corporation practicing architecture 
must obtain a permit, such a corporation more closely fits the defini-
tion of a licensed professional within the meaning of the certificate of 
a qualified expert requirement.195 Nonetheless, the Maryland code 
does not contain any language indicating that a corporation with a 
permit to practice a professional service is within the definition of li-
censed professional. 196 Therefore, if corporations practicing architec-
ture are entitled to the protection offered by the certificate of a 
qualified expert requirement based on the notion of giving effect to 
legislative intent,197 there is no reason to deny such protection to a 
corporation engaged in professional engineering. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Maryland legislature took an important step in the direction of 
tort reform by enacting the certificate of a qualified expert require-
ment. That protection will prove to be meaningless under the Court 
of Appeals' recent decision in RTKL Associates to not extend to the 
corporate practice of these professions. On the other hand, an exten-
sion of the protection to corporations would be consistent with both 
legislative intent and prior Maryland case law. Further, the courts' 
narrow reading of the statute, which denies corporations the protec-
tion of the certificate of a qualified expert requirement, may render 
the statute unconstitutional. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals 
should reverse the holding of RTKL Associates and grant corporations 
practicing architecture or professional engineering the protection of-
fered by the certificate of a qualified expert requirement. 
Gregory M. Garrett 
193. See MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Oee. & PROF. § 3-403. 
194. See MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Oee. & PROF. § 14-401 to 14-602. 
195. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PRoe. § 3-2C-01(c)(1), (d)(l) (2002). 
196. Id. § 3-2C-01(c). 
197. Pack Shack, Inc. v. Howard County, 371 Md. 243, 253, 808 A.2d 795, 800 
(2002) . 
